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·l>ETERMINED·IN ' 
THE SUPRE~IECOURT 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[Sac. No. 7398. JnBank~June19, 1962.] • 
RICHARD J. PAULSON,Petitio~er,v.THESUPERIOR 
COURT OF EL DORADO COUNTY, Respondent ; THE 
PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. . 
. [1] Prohibition-Application', of, Rules~Oriminal Proceedings.-
Prohibition is a proper remcdy to prevent retrial when' a de-
fendant has been once in jeopardy. 
[2] Oriminal Law-Former Jeopardy-When Jeopardy Attaches;~ 
Jeopardy attaches to a <lcfendant when be is placed on trial 
before a court of competent jurisdiction on a valid indictment· 
or information before a jury duly impaneled and charged with 
his deliverance. 
[3] Id.-Former Jeopardy-When Jeopardy Attaches.-If a jury 
is discharged without a verdiet, defendant cannot again be 
put in. jeopardy unless be consented ,to the discharge or legal 
necessity required it. 
['] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Discharge of Jury.-The discharge of 
a jury contrary to law is equivalent to a verdict of acquittal. 
[1] See .Cal.Jur.2d, Prohibition, § 64 et seq.; Am.Jur., Prohi-
bition, § 22. . 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 183 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crim-
inal Law,.§'369 et seq. 
[4] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 188 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crim-
inal Law, § 406 et seq. , 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Prohibition, § 41; [2, S] Criminal 
Law, § 120; [4, 13] Criminal Law, § 132; [6] Criminal Law, 
§§ 354,1303; [6,7, 9-12] Criminal Law, § 354; [8] Criminal Law, , 1334. I
• C.2d-l 
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(5] Id.-Jury-Discharge Aftel' Retirement: Appeal-Discretion 
of Trial Court.-AIthough the determination whether there it' 
a reasonable probability that the jury can agree rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court, the power of the court to 
discharge a jury without the prisoner's consent is not an abso-
lute, uncontrolled discretionary power. The power must be 
exercised in accordance with established legal rules and a 
sound leg'nl discretion in the application of such rules to the 
facts and circumstances of each particular case, and the exer-
cise of the power is subject to review by an appellate court. 
(6] Id.-Jury-Di5charge After Retirement.-An extrajudicial re-
port from the jury that it e:mnot agree on a "erdict does not 
justify its discharge. 
(7] Id.-Jury-Diseharge After Retirement.-There was no justifi-
cation for discharging a jury on the basis of the bailiff's report 
that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked where the jury was 
discharged after deliberatin~ less than five hours, and where, 
though the jury returned to the courtroom to have four ques-
tions answered, they were given no opportunity to consider 
the judge's answers during further deliberations, no juror ever 
stated in open court that he thought the jury could not reach 
an agreement, and defendant's counsel was not present when . 
the bailiff made the report and did not learn of this extra-
judicial communication until the judge alluded to it in re-
fusing to entertain defendant's plea of once in jeopardy 17 
days after the jury was discharged. 
(8] Id.-Jury-Communications Between Court and Jury.-All 
communications between court and jury should be made in 
open court. Ordinary procedure would require that the trial 
judge afford the parties an opportunity to be apprised of any 
such communication and to have the opportunity to make 
timely objection to any action by the court or jury which 
might be deemed irregular. 
[9] Id.-Jury-Discharge After Retirement.-Ordinarily the trial 
judge should not discharge a jury on the ground that there i'3 
no reasonable probability that the jury can agree witbout 
questioning the jurors individually as to such probability. 
(10] Id.-Jury-Discharge After Retirement.-The statute does 
not provide what procedure shall be taken to determine the 
probability of an agreement between the jurors, but the court 
may obtain from them an expression of their judgment and, 
in the exercise of the discretion committed to it, give such 
weigbt to this opinion as the surrounding circumstances seem 
to demand. 
[11] Id.-Jury-Discharge After Retirement.-AItbough the judge 
, need not state that he is discharging the jury because there 
is no reasonable probability that they can agree when it is . 
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apparent from the record that he discharged the jury for that 
reason, such probability is not npparent from a record showing 
that, after the jury entered the courtroom, the foreman stated 
that no verdict had been rene\tt'd, hut he ;;ave no indication 
that he or any other juror considered further deliberations 
futile. Hi:!! 113king the judge to inl'truct on two points of law 
and to clarify two evidentiary matters strongly suggests that 
the jurors felt they could reach a verdict if these legal and 
factual questions could be re!'olvetl. 
[12] Id.-Jury-Discharge After Retirement.-It was not neces-
sary to diRcharge the jury ufter it had deliberated for less than 
five hours on the ground that the ends of justice would other-
wise be defeated where the trial judge knew that the jury 
stood ten for acquittal and two {or conviction on onc of two 
counts for grand theft. 
[IS] ld.-Former Jeopardy-Discharge of Jury.-Once the jury is 
impaneled and sworn, defendant is in jeopardy. He cannot 
be deprived of any benefit to be derived from that jeopardy 
and is entitled to have the jury render a verdict when he haR 
not consented to the discharge of the jury and there is no legal 
necessity for sueh discharge. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of El Dorado County from retrying petitioner on 
criminal charges following a mistrial. Writ granted. 
Lynn Carman for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Nat A. Agliano, Deputy At-
torney General, for Real Party in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-III this proceeding in prohibition petitioner 
seeks to preclude his trial on two counts of grand theft on 
the ground that the trial would h-Yice put him in jeopardy 
in violation of article I, section 13 of the California Con-
stitution. 
On December 18 and 19, 1961, petitioner was tried by a 
jury on two counts of grand theft. The jury retired at 4 :12 
p.m. on December 19 and returned to the courtroom at 9 :05 
p.m. When th~ court asked if the j\ll'y had arrived at a ver-
dict, the foreman replie(l, "Yonr IlOilOI', wc have not reached 
a verdict. We have some questions that we would like to ask 
and advice from the Court if we may t" The first question, 
) 
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relating to Count 1, was whether a charge of theft is nullified 
if the victim agreed to accept weekly paYD1ents as restitution. 
The court reread an instruction that restitution is not a de-
fense. The second question, relating to Count 2, was "would 
negligence in the care of the funds, whereby another persoll 
D1ay have stolen the money still leave the Defendant responsi-
ble anu guilty of theft Y" The court answered: " Well, Mr. 
Foreman, we are here only concerned with the charge against 
the Defendant. No one else is charged with theft. The De-
fendant is not charged with negligence, be is cbarged witb 
tbeft. If from the evidence you find that the Defendant is 
110t guilty, find him not guilty. If under tbe evidence you 
find that he is guilty, find him guilty in accordance with the 
evidence and the instructions. Now, that is all the Court can 
say." The third and fourth questions involved two eviden-
tiary matters that were clarified by the court and counsel. 
The following exchange then ensued: 
"THE COURT: What is your next question' 
"FOREMAN RIPLEY: That is all I have here, Your Honor, 
unless some question has arisen in the minds of any of the 
jurors at this time. 
"THE COURT: Now, Mr. Foreman, without indicating which 
way you stand, that is, for guilt or for innocence, without 
indicating which way you stand, tell the Court numerically 
how the jury stands on Count 1 f 
., FOREMAN RIPLEY: Last count was 10 for acquittal-
"THE COURT: No. 
e, FOREMAN RIPLEY: I beg your pardon. I misunderstood 
your question, sir. 
"THE COURT: All right. Numerically how do they stand Y 
"FOREMAN RIPLEY: Shall I proceed with what I said f 10 
for acquittal-
"THE COURT: No. Without indicating whether it is for 
guilt or for innocence, indicate numerically how the jury 
stood. 
"FOREMAN RIPLEY: 10 to 2. 
"THE COURT: How did the Jury stand on Count 2 numer-
ically, without indicating which way Y 
"FOREMAN RIPLEY: Seven to five. 
"THE COURT: Well, it just appears to the Court, Mr. Fore-
man, that this Jury has been confused. Some of the jurors 
are off on a tangent. Apparcntly they have misconceived the 
evidence, failed to understand the instructions or have not 
) 
June 19621 PAUl.SON I'. SUPt·:lt\OR COURT 
'(~3 C.2d 1: 2~ CaI.Rpt:.6(9. 37~ P.2d 641] 
been able to apply the instructions to theevidellce. I feel that 
I should declar.e this a .mistrial. . 
"The Court ueclare.s this ease a mh;trial. The Jury is dis-
charged with the thanks of the Court." 
On January 5, 1962, the court refused to entertain peti-
tioner's plea of once in jeopardy and reset the case for trial. ' 
The parties have stipulated that the bailiff reported to the 
judge "approximately twohour.s after, the case had been 
submitted to the jury, that the foreman of the jury statf'd to 
the bailiff that the jury was'hopf'lessly deadlocked,' and that 
this report was made to said judge at Ii time when the court 
. was not in sessiou and for that reason is not a part of the 
record in said action." The stipulation expressly states that 
petitioner did not waive his right to object to the admissi-
bility of this report. 
[1] Prohibition is a proper remedy to prevent retrial 
when a defendant has been once in jeopardy. (Cardenas v. 
Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 273,275 . [14 Cal.Rptr. 657, 363 
P.2d 889] ; Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 Ca1.2d 640, 652 [328 
P.2d 976]; Jackson v. Superior Court,}O Cal.2d 350, 352 
(74 P.2d 243, 113 A.L.R. 1422].) 
[9] "[J]eopardy attaches toa defendant when he is 
placed on trial before a court of competent jurisdiction upon 
a valid indictment or information before a jury duly impan-
eled and charged with his deliverance." (Jackson v, Superior 
Court, supra.) [3] If a jury is discharged without return-
ing a verdict, the defendant cannot again be put in jeopardy 
unless he consented to the discharge or legal necessity re-
quired it. (Cardenas v. Superior Court, supra; People ,'. 
Valenti,49 Ca1.2d 199, 209 [316 P.2d 633] i People v. Webb, 
38 Cal. 467, 479-480.) [4] The discharge of a jury con-
trary to law is equivalent to a verdict of acquittal. (Jackson 
v. 8uperior Court, supra, 10 CaL2d at p. 356; People v. Webb, 
,upra,38 Cal. at p.478.) . 
Since petitioner did not consent to the discharge of the jury, 
the sole issue is whether legal necessity required it. There is 
auch necessity when "at the expiration of such time as the 
court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there 
is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree." (Pen. 
Code, § 1140; People v. Smalling, 94 Cal. 112, 115 [29 P. 421] ; 
People v. Cage, 48 Cal. 323, 326 [17 Am.Rep. 436] ; Ex partc 
McLaughlin, 41 Cal. 211, 216 [10 Am.Rep. 272].) The People 
contend that the trial judge was justified in concluding that 
there was no reasonable proLaLility that the jury could agree 
) 
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because of the bailiff's report that the jury was hopelessly 
deadlocked and because it was apparellt from the exchange ill 
open comt bctween the judge alld the foreman of the jury 
that the jurors wcre so confused as to the law and facts 
of the case that they would not be able to reaeh a verdict. 
[5] Although the determination whether there is a rea-
sOllable probability that the jury can agree rests in the sound 
tiisel'etion of the trial court, "( t] he power of the Court to 
discharge a jury without thc conscnt of the prisoner is not 
an absolute, uncontrolled discretionary power. It must be 
exercised in aeeordance with established legal rules and a 
sound legal discretion in the application of such rules to the 
facts and circumstances of each particular case, and in this 
State is subject to review by an appellate Court. H (Ex parte 
McLaughlin, supra, 41 Cal. at pp. 218-219.) 
[ 6 ] An extrajudicial report from the jury that it cannot 
agree on a verdict does not justify its discharge. Thus in 
People v. Cage, 48 Cal. 323, the court ordered the sheriff to 
go to the jury room and inquire if the jury had reached a 
verdict. The order was made in open court in the presence of 
the defendant's counsel. The sheriff reported the jury's an-
swer that they "had not, and could not agree on a verdict." 
The trial judge then adjourned the court for the term one 
day before the term would have expired by operation of law. 
The adjournment operated as a discharge of the jury. In 
holding that a subsequent trial of the defendant for the same 
offense put him twice in jeopardy, the court stated, "It is 
evident that in a matter so gravely affecting the life or liberty 
of the accused, the discretion of the Comt should be exercised 
upon some kind of evidence, and its judgment should be 
expressed in some form upon the rccord. In this case there 
was no evidence upon which the Court was authorizcd to act, 
and no apparent adjudication ...• [The sheriff's report] was 
110 evidence whatever upon which the Court could act." (48 
Cal. at pp. 326-327.) 
[7] The judge in the present case had less justification 
for discharging the jury on the basis of the bailiff's report 
than did the judge in the Cage case. When the jury was dis-
charged in Cage, they had deliberated for four days. They 
had returned to the courtroom once for instructions and had 
returned on the first and third days of deliberation to an-
nounce to the court their inability to agree on a verdict. On 
the second of these occasions the jury stated that they saw 
I no chance for an agreement. During the fourth uay of deli1>-
~ 
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, erations, when the judge ordered the sheriff to ask the jury 
. if they had reached a verdict, the defendant's counsel was 
'. . present and could have interposed an objeetion to this proce-
dure and to the subsequent order adjourning tIle court for 
the term. In the presenLcase,however, the jury ,vas dis-
charged aft~r deliberating .less than five hours. Althoughth<,y 
returned to the courtroom to have four (IUestions aUl>wered, 
they were.givennoopportunity to consider the judge's an-
swersduring further deliberations. No juror ever stated ill 
. open court that he thought the jury could not reach an agre<,-
ment. Petitioller'scounsel.was not present when the bailiff 
·reported to the judge the foreman's opiuion that the jury was 
.... hopelessly deadlocIC(~d.lndeed, it appears from the record 
that petitioner's counseldid.llot learn of this extrajudicial 
communication until the judge alluded to it in refusing to 
entertain petitioner's plea of once in jeopardy 17 days after 
the jury was discharged. [8] Such informal communica-
tions between court and jury are improper. (People v. Alcalde, 
24 Ca1.2d 177,189 [1-18 P.2d627] ; People v. Weatherford, 27 
Ca1.2d 401,418-419 [164 P.2d 753].) <4 [A]ll communications 
should be made in open court. •.. Ordinary procedure would 
require that the trial judge afford the parties an opportunity 
to be apprised of any such communication and to have the 
opportunity to make timely objection to any action by the 
court or jury which might be deemed irregular." (People v. 
Alcalde, sttpra.) Moreover, the judge in the Cage case dis-
charged the jury immediately after the sheriff reported the 
jury's message. In the present case the judge discharged the 
jury three hours after the bailiff's report, during wllich time 
the jury continued to deliberate, evidently in the belief that 
they could reach a verdict. Whatever justification there may 
be for the judge's discharge of the jury must therefore be 
found in the exchange between him and the foreman of the jury. . 
[9] Ordinarily the trial judge should not discharge a 
jury on the ground that there is no reasonable probability that 
the ju~ can agree without questioning the jurors individually 
as to Such probability. (People v. Greene, 100 Cal. 140, 141 
[34 P. 630] ; People v. James, 97 Cal. 400, 402 [32 P. 317] ; 
People v. Smalling, 94' Cal. 112, 115 [29 P. 421]; Ex parte 
JlcLatlghlin, 41 Cal. 211, 218 [10 Am.Rt-p. 272]; People v. 
Sullivan, 101 Cal.App.2d 322, 327 [225 P.2d 645] ; People v. 
Disperati,11 Cal.App. 469, 473 [105 P. 617].) [10] uThe 
statute does not provide just what proceeding shall be taken 
) 
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to determine the probability of an I1greement, but no better 
method occurs to us than to obtain ~ro!t\ the jurors an expres-
siou of their judgJllt'lI t, mill the ('ourt, iu the exercise of the 
discretion committed to it, may giw SUt'll weight to this opin-
ion as the surrounding eir,~um:;talll"es sl,'em to demand." (Peo-
ple v. Disperail, supra.; spc also People v. GreeHI', !'upra, 100 
Cal. at p. 142; People v. Cage, 48 Cal. 323, 327 (17 Am.Rep. 
436].) This procrdure was not followed here. 
[11] Although the judge need not state that he is dis-
charging the jury because there is no reasonable probability 
that they can a~n'ee when it is apparent from the record that 
he uiseharged thc jury for that reason (People v. Greene, 
supra), such probability is not apparent from the record in 
this case. After the jury entered the courtroom, the foreman 
stated that no ycrdic-t had been reached, but he gave no indi-
cation that hp or any other juror considered further delibera-
tions futile. His asking the judge to instruct on two points 
of law and to clarify two evidentiary matters strongly sug-
gests that the jurors felt they could reaeh a verdict if thesc 
legal and factual questions eould be resolved. The short an-
swer to the People's contention that the four questions related 
. to simple matters of law and evidence and indicated that the 
jury was so eonfused that they could not be expected to reach 
a verdict is that the simple (luestions received simple, clear, 
and forthright answers that presumably cleared up any 
confusion the jury may have had. Even if the judge was 
of the opinion that they were still confused, it cannot be 
assumed from their questions or anything else in the record 
that the law and the evid!"nce were so far beyond their under-
standing t hat further instructions would have been futile. 
r 12 ] There is no merit in the People's contention that it 
was necessary to discharge the jury because the ends of jus-
tice would otherwise be defeated. Gori v. United States, 367 
U.S. 364 [81 S.Ct. 1523,6 L.Ed.2d 901], on which the People 
rely, held that there was no violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment't> prohibition against double jeopardy when the trial 
judge declared the first trial a mistrial without the defendant's 
consent since he "was acting according to his convictions in 
protecting the rights of the accused, " and" in the sole interest 
of the defendant." (367 U.S. at pp. 366, 369.) Clearly no 
such motive prompted the trial judge's action in this case, 
for he knew that the jury stood ten for acquittal and two for 
conviction on Count 1. Moreover, we pointed out in Cardenas 
, v. Superiur Court, 56 Ca1.2d 273, 275-276 [14 Cal.Rptr. 657, 
I 
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363 P.2d 889], that the Gori holding is not in accord with 
California law. 
[13] Once the jury is impaneled and sworn, the defend-
ant is in jeopardy. He cannot be deprived of any benefit to 
be derived from that jeopardy and is entitled to have the 
jury render a verdict, when, as in this case, he has not con-
sented to the discharge of the jury and there is nolegal neces-
sity for such discharge. (People v. Ny Sa.m Ohung, 94 Cal. 
304, 307 [29 P. 642, 28 Am.St.Rep. 29] ; People v. Hunckeler, 
48 Cal. 331, 334.) 
Let the peremptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed. 
Gibson,C.J., Peters, .J., White, J., and Dooling,J., "Con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. 
On December 18 and 19, 1961, petitioner was tried by a 
jury on two counts of grand theft. The jury retired at 4 ;12 
p.m. on December 19 and returned to the courtroom at 9 :05 
p.m. When the court asked if the jury had arrived at a ver-
dict, the foreman replied: "Your Honor, we have not reached 
a verdict. We have some questions that we would like to ask 
and advice from the Court if we may'" 
The :first question, relating to count 1, was whether a charge 
of theft is nullified if the victim agreed to accept weekly pay-
ments as restitution. The court reread an instruction that 
restitution is not a defense. 
The second question, relating to count 2, was, ('Would 
llegligence in the care of the funds, whereby another person 
may have stolen the money still leave the Defendant respon-
sible and guilty of theft'" The court answered: "Well, Mr. 
Foreman, we are here only concerned with the charge against 
the Defendant. No one else is charged with theft. The De-
fendant is not charged with negligence, he is charged with 
theft. If from the evidence you find that the Defendant is 
not guilty, find him not guilty. If under the evidence you 
find that he is guilty, find him guilty in accordance with the 
evidence and the instructions. Now, that is all the Court can 
say." 
The court, of course, had previously advised the jury that 
if there was any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the de-
fendant, he was entitled to a verdict of not guilty. The infor-
mation had also been read to the jury and the essential 
elements of the offense explained to them. 
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The third and fourth questions involved two evidentiary 
matters that were clarified by thecollrt . and counsel. The 
following exchange then ensued: ., THE COURT : What is your 
.llext question' FOREMAN.RIPLEY: That is all I have here, 
Your fHtohno~, unlesstsoth~e t~uestioTn haCs arisen Nin the .. ~inFds of .,1,:, 
any 0 e Jurors a 18 Ime. HE. OURT:· ow, J,Y.Lr.. ore-
man, without indicating which way you stand, that is, for f 
guilt or for innocence, without indicating which way you I 
stand, tell the Court numerically how the jury stands on 
Count 17 FOREMAN RIPLEY: Last count was 10 for. acquittal-
. THE COURT: No. FOREMAN RIPLEY: I beg your pardon. I 
misunderstood your question, sir. THE COURT: All right. Nu-
merically how do they stand' FOREMAN RIPLEY: Shall I pro-
ceed with what I said T 10 for acquittal-THE COURT : No. 
Without indicating whether it is for guilt or for innocence, 
indicate numerically how the jury stood 'FOREMAN RIPLEY: 
10 to 2. THE COURT: How did the Jury stand on Count 2 
numerically, without indicating which wayf FORE1UNRIP- .. 
LEY: Seven to five. THE COURT : Well, it just appears to. the 
Court, Mr. Foreman, that this Jury has been confused. Some 
of the jurors are off on a·· tangent. Apparently they have 
misconceived the evidence, failed to understand theinstruc-
tions or have not been able to apply the instructions to the 
evidence. I feel that I should declare this a mistrial. The 
Court declares this case a mistrial. The Jury is discharged 
with the thanks of the Court." 
The question here presented is whether the trial judge was 
justified under section 1140 of the Penal Code in discharging 
the jury. I believe he was.. . . 
Section 1140 of the Penal Code provides: "Except as pro; 
:vided by law, the jury cannot be discharged after the cause 
is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict 
and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of both par-
ties, entered upon the minutes, or unless, at the ea;piration 
of such time (J,S the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily 
appears Jhat there is no rC(J,SonGble probability that the jur" 
can agree." (Italics added.) . 
Whether there is a re~onable probability that the jury can 
agree rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. The 
power of the court to discharge a jury without the consent 
of the prisoner is not absolute; it must be exercised in accord-
ance with established legal rules and a sound legal discretion 
L in the application of such rules to the facts and circuDlStances 
) 
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of each particular case. (Ex parte McLaughli11, 41 Cal. 211, 
218 et seq. [10 Am.Rep. 272].) 
In the instant case the trial judge questioned the foreman 
in the presence of all parties as to how the jury stood numer-
ically on reaching a verdict. After receiving this information 
and having fully instructed the jury as to the elements of 
the offense charged and having observed the jurors for two 
days and listened to the questions of the foreman and his 
answers to the judge's questions relative to the standing of 
the jury, the trial judge was justified in finding that the jury 
was unable to agrce and therefore, under the provisions of 
section 1140 of the Penal Code, incoming to the conclusion 
that there was no reasonable probability that the jury could 
agree and was correct in his ruling discharging them. 
This conclusion is supported by the rule in this state that 
on appeal all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in 
favor of the respondent and all legitimate and reasonable 
inferences indulged to uphold the findings of the trial court 
if possible. Where the findings are attacked for insufficiency 
of the evidence, the power of the appellate court begins and 
ends with a determination as to whether there is any substan-
tial evidence to support them. (Estate of Bristol, 23 Ca1.2d 
221, 223 [2] [143 P.2d 689J.) 
In Estate of Bristol this court said, at page 223 [3] : "It is 
common knowledge among judges and lawyers that many cases 
are determined to the entire satisfaction of trial judges or 
juries, on their factual issues, by evidence which is overwhelm-
ing in its persuasiveness but which may appear relatively 
unsubstantial-if it call be reflected at all-in a phonographic 
record. Appe1late courts, therefore, if there be any reasonable 
doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding, 
should resolve that doubt in favor of the finding; and in 
searching the record and exploring the inferences which may 
arise from what is found there, to discover whether such doubt 
or conflict exists, the court should be realistic and practicaL" 
Upon such a view of the law, the finding of the trial court in 
the present case ~hould be sustained. 
The factual situation presented to the jury in the case at 
bar was not complicated. The owner of a restaurant at Lake 
Tahoe had engaged petitioner and his wife to manage the 
restaurant. Thc terms were $100 per week and either one-
half or one-third of the net profits. Petitioner was to receive 
$75 pcr week and his wife $25. They were also to have lodging 
and certain meals at the restaurant. The owner stayed with 
) 
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petitioner for several days to show him the procedure for 
bookkeeping and procured for him deposit bags for the money 
which was to beleft each evening in the bank's night deposi-
tory. The owner came up to Lake Tahoe once a week and paid 
the employees and took back with him the tapes from thecash 
register and tickets in order to set up his own ledger and 
have his accountant .post the figures. 
This arrangement began about August 12 or 13. August 
29 when the owner arrived at Lake Tahoe he found that peti-
tioner had' not made any deposits for the period August 21 
through August 27. He had a conversation with petitioner, 
in which petitioner admitted that he had used this money to 
payoff his own pressing bad checks and promised to repay 
the moDf"y at $50 per week. The owner agreed, since petitioner 
had already taken the money. 
On September 1] the owner was advised by another em-
ployee that petitioner had left the premises and taken all of 
his belongings with him. The owner theneame up to Lake 
Tahoe and found that although the receipts and register tapes 
were left in the restaurant, no money had been deposited in 
the bank account for September 8, 9, or 10, nor was the $150 
present which had been kept in. the register for change. He 
also found that the special deposit bags he had given. peti-
tioner to use had been in the bank since the last deposit on 
Septpmber 7. 
The net amount taken for the period August 22 through 
August 27 was approximately $642.33, and the amount taken 
for the period September 8 through September 11 was $411.92. 
Petitioner made no demand for his last pay check or for an 
accounting and left no forwarding address. The net profit 
for the period that petitioner operated the restaurant was 
approximately $130. 
Petitioner's defense was that as to the first count relating 
to the money taken during the period August 21 through 
August 27, he had this money undeposited when he spoke to 
the owner, and asked to borrow it, and the owner agreed that 
he could borrqw it and repay it at $50 per week; that they 
had no discussion of any interest; and that he used it to pick 
up his outstanding bad checks, which he immediately de-
stroyed. . 
As to the second count, petitioner alleged that he had each 
day's deposit in a money bag, which he at first put in his car 
when he was thinking about leaving the employ of the owner, 
and then just before he left, he placed these money bags in 
\ 
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the box inthc restaurant with the rE'gister tapes and left them 
there with a note to the owner that he was leaving and would 
. write him after he was settled. 
A further defense was petitioner's aJ!egedill health from 
his high fever, which, according to the testimony of his expert, 
resulted in his suffering from an intoxication due to endoge-
nous intoxicants .. This resulted, according to the expert's 
testimony, in a clouding of petitioner's consciousness. 
With this statement of the evidence in mind, it appears that 
the questions asked by the foreman of the jury patently dis-
played the jury's misconception of the charge of theft. . 
The first question was as to whether the agreement to accept 
weekly payments by the victim would nullify a possible charge . 
of theft and change it to the •• status of a contract to pay on 
installments.' , 
The question with relation to the second count was whether 
negligence in the care of funds by petitioner whereby an-
other person stole the money would leave him responsible for 
the theft. 
A subsequent question related to the whereabouts of the 
keys to the bags. The record contained no testimony in this 
regard. 
Thereafter the jury was questioned as to their numerical 
division on each count. It was 10-2 on the first count and 
7-5 on the second. It was at this point that the court declared 
a mistrial. 
It is apparent that if the jury believed petitioner and his 
testimony, he would not have had a fraudulent intent. How-
ever, they apparently did not believe this, or at least some 
of them did not comprehend the instructions of the court that 
restitution is 110ta defense. 
The trial judge viewed the individuals comprising the jury 
and was familiar with their demeanor and at least to some 
extent with their individual propensities. From the questions 
propounded to him he apparently concluded that they could 
not reach an agreement on any count, inasmuch as . some of 
them obviously had not comprehended the evidence, the in-
structions of the court, or the elements of the charges which 
were before them. Under those circumstances it was not 
unreasonable for the judge to conclude that it was unlikely 
that all of the jurors could ever agree on a verdict. Hence 
the discharge of the jury by the court could not be said to be . 
an abuse of discretion. (People v. Sullivan, 101 Cal.App.2d j 
322, 328 et seq. [225 P.2d 645].) 
) 
14 PAULSON V. SUl'ERIOU COURT [58 C.2d 
'I'he time that a jury should be held for deliberation is 
within the trial court's discretion. (People v. Casserio, 16 Cal. 
App.2d 223, 228 [41 [60 P.2d 5051; People v. Wooley, 15 
Cal.App.2d 669, 673 [21 [59 P.2d 10651.) 
The result which I have reached is supported by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in its holding in National 
Labor Relat·ions Board v. Walton Manufacturing Co., 369 
U.S. 404 [82 S.Ct. 853, 855, 7 L.Ed.2d 8291, where the court 
said: "But the Examiner-the one whose appraisal of the 
testimony was discredited by the Court of Appeals in Florida 
Citrus Canners Cooperative case-sees the witnesses and hears' 
them testify, while the Board and the reviewing court look 
only at cold records. As we said in the Univc1'sal Camera case 
[340 U.S. 474 (71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456)] : '. . . The find-
ings of the examiner are to be considered along with the con-
sistency and inherent probability of testimony. The significance 
of his report, of course, depends largely on the importance 
of credibility in the particular case.' 340 U.S., at 406, 71 S.Ct. 
at 469. For the demeanor of a witness' ... may satisfy the 
tribunal, not only that the witness' testimony is not true, but 
that the truth is the opposite of his story; for the denial of 
one, who has a motive to deny, may be uttered with such 
hesitation, discomfort, arrogance or defiance, as to give assur-
ance that he is fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no 
alternative but to assume the truth of what he denies.' Dyer 
v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269." 
The peremptory writ of prohibition, in my opinion, should 
be denied. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
